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ABSTRACT 
Input sanitization mechanisms are widely used to mitigate 
vulnerabilities to injection attacks such as cross-site scripting. 
Static analysis tools and techniques commonly used to ensure that 
applications utilize sanitization functions. Dynamic analysis must 
be to evaluate the correctness of sanitization functions. The 
proposed approach is based on unit testing to bring the advantages 
of both static and dynamic techniques to the development time. 
Our approach introduces a technique to automatically extract the 
sanitization functions and then evaluate their effectiveness against 
attacks using automatically generated attack vectors. The 
empirical results show that the proposed technique can detect 
security flaws cannot find by the static analysis tools. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.2.5 [Software Engineering]: Testing and debugging – Code 
inspections and walk-throughs. D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: 
Security and Protection – Verification.  
General Terms 
 Security, Verification. 
Keywords 
Unit testing; cross-site scripting (XSS); program analysis; 
sanitization correctness; grammar-based attack generation 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Web applications consume data from different inputs. Some of 
these inputs are originated from untrusted sources, such as user 
inputs, and referred as untrusted sources. In addition, many of the 
data from these sources will be used in functions such as sending 
data to the outputs or accessing the databases referred as sensitive 
sinks. In the case of injection attacks and more specifically in 
cross-site scripting attacks, some of these sinks are sensitive to 
certain characters or keywords, affecting their functionalities and 
so malicious inputs can change their planned functionalities to 
dangerous actions. Therefor any arbitrary inputs cannot be used 
for them as input.  Attacks of type command injections or XSS are 
results of such problems. To deal with this problem web 
applications use sanitization functions to make the untrusted 
inputs free of texts that can be interpreted as scripts. But how we 
can ensure about the correctness of sanitization functions? 
Although the sanitization process can be applied to all types of the 
injection attacks we have focused on cross-site scripting (XSS) 
attacks in this paper. Sanitization to prevent XSS is context-
sensitive. Context here means in which place the untrusted source 
is going to be used after sanitization. There are different contexts 
as Html, JavaScript, and style sheets and each of them have 
different sanitization requirements. Meanwhile, based on many 
practical experiences and successful attacks vectors, there are 
different sanitization problems[5]: 1) Context inconsistency and 
2) Order of the sanitization functions. The conceptual examples 
shown in Figure 1 demonstrate these problems. 
 
1) <input type='button' onclick=" …<%=  
StringEscapeUtils.escapeHtml( UNTRUSTED) %> " /> 
2)<% htmlEsc = StringEscapeUtils.escapeHtml( UNTRUSTED); %> 
<input type='button' onclick=" …<%= StringEscapeUtils. 
escapeJavascriptl (  htmlEsc ) %> " /> 
Figure 1. Context-sensitive sanitization 
 
In the first example (Figure 1) the Html escaping is used in the 
event (onclick) context, which is a JavaScript context. Html 
escaping is insufficient to prevent XSS attacks. In the second one, 
the order of applying the JavaScript escaping function is wrong 
and it has no effect on the previously sanitized using Html 
escaping function. Figure 6 and Figure 7 show real attack vectors 
for such problems for the first and the second problem 
respectively. The root cause of these problems can be seen better 
by looking deeper into internal behavior of the browsers. The 
browsers have different internal interpreters for different 
grammars such as mentioned before and each of them is sensitive 
to different characters and keywords (Problem 1). In addition, 
once these interpreters encounter a keyword and before 
transferring the control to another interpreter, they may decode 
some of the input stream characters, causing some issues namely 
as browser transduction problem [5](Problem 2). Currently, static 
analysis tools widely used to check whether the web application 
use any kind of sanitization or not, but these tools can only check 
the existence of sanitizers and not their correctness. Here 
correctness means both satisfying the requirements of the target 
context the sanitizer is designed for and also the order of the 
sanitizations used in the path from the untrusted sources to 
security sinks. A single untrusted source could have different 
sanitization paths (section ‎2.2) based on different control flows 
and target security contexts and thus the type and order of 
sanitizations used in each path should be different. 
2. APPROACH 
Our proposed approach is based on automatic generation of 
security test cases. Software testing tools and methodologies 
always has to deal with the structural coverage problem[6]. In the 
case of evaluating the sanitizations paths spread in different 
modules of an application, two challenges can be revealed. The 
first one is finding all sanitization functions applied to untrusted 
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sources across the application modules and the second one is the 
generating test inputs to maximize the quality and reliability of 
testing trials. Automatic security test cases generation serve these 
purposes. This approach is implemented as an IDE plug-in to 
automatically build security “Test Cases” based on extracted 
sanitization paths and then evaluating them by injecting attacks 
scripts. The automated generated test cases composed of 3 
different sections (Figure 2): Attack generation, Sanitization path 
extraction and Attack evaluation. These steps described as below. 
SanitizationPath-TestCase() 
{ 
atkVec=Attack-Generation(); 
sanInp=Sanitization-Path(atkVec); 
Assert Attack-Evaluation(sanInp); 
} 
Figure 2. General structure of security test cases 
2.1 Attack generation  
The goal is to automatically generate attack vectors for the 
application under unit testing. We want to ensure that, if there is 
an attack vector capable of exploiting a vulnerable sanitization 
path, this attack vector can be generated. In other words the false 
negative rate of this section should be zero or very low. One 
approach to generate attack vectors is to use attack vector 
repositories containing different attack patterns such as OWASP 
XSS evasion list but obviously it is impossible to estimate the 
false negative rates of such repositories.  The other approach is to 
generate attack scripts based on the specific application context of 
the injection point. Injection point is the sink or the final 
destination of the untrusted variable after sanitization. It is the 
place the attackers try to inject their attack scripts to exploit 
potential vulnerabilities. As mentioned before, the browsers have 
different internal contexts which each of them correspond to one 
grammar. These contexts fall into either an executable context or a 
non-executable context. The only executable context is defined by 
the JavaScript grammar. Here the goal of attackers is to trick the 
browsers to run their attack scripts directly. If the injection point 
is already in a JavaScript context it could be (at its simplest form) 
an attack vector to end the current statement and then start a 
malicious code (attack payload). But if it is in a non-executable 
context such as HTML tag attribute, at first it should change the 
current context (grammar) to a JavaScript enabled one (e.g. using 
“javascript:” keyword in tag‟s value) and then run the malicious 
code. In general an attack vector could have a pattern composed 
of pre-escaping characters, attack payload, post-escaping 
characters. The Figure 3 shows this pattern in action. 
 
<input type='button' onclick=" Func(‘ UNTRUSTED’); " /> 
 Pre escaping  Attack Payload  Post escaping 
„); Alert(1); // 
Figure 3. Attack vector pattern 
Here attack payload is a character string, which should be a valid 
statement in the target grammar. In the case of XSS attacks the 
target grammar is JavaScript. Also pre-escaping and post-escaping 
strings are completely application and context-sensitive. In other 
words, these escaping characters will be determined considering 
the context and the surrounding characters of the injection point. 
Moreover, considering the flow of data and internal behavior of 
the browsers in different contexts explained in [5] and also formal 
published html specifications, we can assume that there is a 
branching mechanism( e.g. a switch-case statement)  in the 
browser engine which calls a certain grammar interpreter based on 
the parsed token and then transfer the control to this interpreter. 
Using this view, it can be said that an attack vector is an input that 
tries to modify the source code to prevent the browser interpreting 
in a planned branch and change control to the JavaScript branch 
or change the current interpreting flow of characters if the it is 
already in JavaScript context. We can cast this problem formally 
based on previous researches in symbolic execution. A path 
coverage problem is to select a range of input values in such way 
that a particular point of an application can be reached (after 
passing constraints from entry points to the destination). The 
attack script generation problem is a path coverage problem, 
which aimed to reach a particular branch (JavaScript interpreter) 
of the application (browser). We define all surrounding characters 
of the injection point in most recent DOM element as the 
constraints. If this constraint can be solved, an attack vector exists 
and if not we are sure that no attack vector exists for this 
combination of context and constraint. Solution (attack vector) is 
a string that should be solved using rules of both current and 
target (if they are different) grammars of injection point. The 
architecture of the attack generation is shown in  Figure 4. 
 
 
 Figure 4. Attack generation architecture 
 
 Figure 4 shows attack generation architecture, which contains a 
constraint solver box customized to solve constraints satisfying 
different grammars. Obviously solving the constraints depends on 
their complexities and may be very time consuming[2]. These 
constraints are all string constraints that should be expressed in 
regular and context-free grammars [4] in order to be efficiently 
solved by constraint solver. 
2.2 Sanitization path extraction 
 The goal sanitization path extraction is to build a model of the 
application that only contains input sanitization logic leaving 
aside other application specific logic.  
String login = (String)df.get("username"); //Untrusted Source 
login =ESAPI.validator().getValidInput("User", login, …. .); 
… 
System.err.println(ESAPI.encoder().encodeForHTML(login)); 
Extracted Sanitization Path: 
login=ESAPI.validator().getValidInput("User", login, …); 
ESAPI.encoder().encodeForHTML(login) 
Figure 5. Sanitization Path Extraction 
A sanitization path, which is called path from now on, is the 
combination of all sanitization functions applied to one untrusted 
source and the variables derived from it in the same order 
appeared in the source code (Figure 5). Two paths are similar if 
the type and order of their functions are the same. Considering 
this definition it is very likely that different sources have similar 
paths but based on the context of their final sensitive operation, 
they can be vulnerable to different attack scripts. Similar paths 
mean similar test cases, which required to be merged to one test 
case. This process uses static analysis techniques such dataflow 
and control flow analysis to extract the sanitization paths. The 
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Surrounding text 
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Solver 
Attack 
Vector 
important point here is that because untrusted string values can 
take different control flows before be used in sensitive operations, 
it is required that all possible control flow structures such as 
if/else statements and function calls considered. In the proposed 
approach the developers would declare the sanitization functions 
to be monitors and extracted. Current limitations are that only 
server-side functions and only the string type untrusted sources 
are considered for any analysis. 
2.3 Attack evaluation  
The goal of attack evaluation is to assess whether the extracted 
sanitization path is vulnerable to the generated attack scripts. 
There are some challenges for this evaluation. The first one is that 
because some sanitization flaws, such as browser transduction, 
can only be revealed when the attack scripts execute in a real 
browser, thus the attacks should be really executed. This can be 
(approximately) accomplished using browser components or 
libraries such as JWebUnit. The second challenge is that some 
vulnerabilities are triggered only by user interactions as html links 
or mouse hovers. To deal with this issue, the proposed technique 
simulates the user interactions using features provided by browser 
components. It is noteworthy that all of this process is done in a 
unit-testing framework such as JUnit. Advantages of using unit-
testing framework are two folds. The first one is the popularity of 
these frameworks among the developers, which makes its usage 
fairly straightforward by efficient utilization of their features such 
as whole test process automation. The second advantage is early 
discovery of the vulnerabilities and  increase security awareness 
of developers[7] causing improvements in time and cost of 
removing security flaws. 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We applied the proposed approach to an open source web-based 
medical application (iTrust) and found a zero-day vulnerability in 
one of its modules. In this application untrusted input is used in 
an event context, a JavaScript context, but the sanitization used 
for this purpose is not matched with the sink‟s context (Figure 6). 
In this case the request.getParameter("forward")  is an untrusted 
source which is sanitized using StringEscapeUtils.escapeHtml() 
which is not safe for the target context.  
 
<input type='button onclick= "parent.location.href= 'getPatientID.jsp? 
forward= <%=StringEscapeUtils.escapeHtml("" + ( 
request.getParameter("forward") )) %> ';”     …  /> 
Attack vector:  ‘; alert(1); // 
Figure 6. Sanitization flaw found in the iTrust 
String  sant= StringEscapeUtils.escapeHtml (source); 
sant = StringEscapeUtils.escapejavascript (sant); 
tag.innerHTML = '<a onclick="MyFunc(\'' + <%= sant %> + '\')">' + sant + 
'</a>’; 
Attack vector:  '); Alert(1);// 
Figure 7. A Conceptual nested sanitization flaw 
Also we applied the proposed technique to a conceptual example 
containing nested contexts to introduce browser transduction 
challenge. In this case the source is an untrusted source used in an 
event context and sanitized for both context of html and 
JavaScript but the order of sanitization is not correct (Figure 7). 
The attack script  '); Alert(1);//  at first will be escaped to 
&#34;);alert(1);// which will not be changed by the second 
sanitization because the single quote character escaped as &#34; 
and because all of the characters  are legal, the &#34; characters 
will be  decoded  to single quote „ at run time by the browser and 
so causing the attack script to be successful. 
4. RELATED WORK 
Previous research [1] performed heuristic dynamic evaluation of 
sanitization functions by injecting predefined attack vectors, 
making it difficult to evaluate false negatives. Our approach 
generates attack vectors based on the application under testing 
and can demonstrate low false negatives, given sufficient 
computing resources Researchers in[3] introduced a vulnerability 
injector tool(VAIT) for SQL injection.  It is not clear this can be 
generalized to other types of injection attacks. None of these 
works and many of similar ones have considered unit-testing 
approach to bring their evaluations into early software 
development cycle. 
5. CONCLUSION 
We propose a unit testing based approach to detect injection 
vulnerabilities that can complement static analysis and ensure 
sanitizations are performed correctly. This approach can be fully 
integrated into IDEs as a development time plugin, combining 
static and dynamic security testing features. It means that this 
integration can be efficiently adjusted to satisfy agile software 
development life cycle requirements and methodologies.  
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